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Introduction
The world is in a state of flux regarding the choice of monetary and exchange rate regimes. One option is giving up national currencies to join a monetary union Since Mundell (1961) the literature has emphasized conventional OCA criteria in shaping this decision. EMU, the largest historical experiment in giving up sovereignty in monetary (and other) policy areas, has captured the imagination of policy makers and researchers alike. It has also brought other issues, related to complementary areas of reform and integration, to the forefront of theory and policy analysis. These issues shape the discussion about monetary union and, more generally, on optimal regime choice for countries in other regions, including Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
The purpose of this paper is to assess selective issues on the long-run sustainability of monetary unions, in the light of theory and of the experience of EMU, and to draw its lessons for regime choice, and monetary union in particular, for LAC. In section 2 we briefly review recent world trends in exchange rate and monetary regimes and a summary of estimates of the benefits and costs of EMU. This leads to discussing four important issues that are crucial in the theory and EMU experience of monetary union, related to complementary areas of policy coordination and integration among prospective union members (Section 3). Then we discuss the issues that shape monetary and regime choice in LAC, with particular consideration of recent trends and literature and the prospects for monetary union in the light of the EMU experience. Section 5 concludes briefly.
Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes: From the Real World to Optimality

Considerations
World Trends in Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes
The world is in a state of flux regarding the choice of monetary (M) and exchange rate (ER) regimes. Many countries and full regions have shifted regimes -gradually by careful design (as in EMU) or quickly forced by markets (as in Ecuador 2000 or Argentina 2002 ). Here we review recent world trends in ER and M regimes. This will help in the subsequent discussion of selective issues on monetary union illustrated by EMU and the regime challenges faced by LAC.
The world evolution in ER regimes is illustrated by IMF data on countries' official regime definitions (Figure 1 ). The share of fixed ER regimes in the world -comprising no independent currency, currency boards, or pegged ERs -has declined from 68% of countries in 1979 to 49% in 2001, while managed and independent floats have increased from 17% to 42%. Intermediate regimes, where ERs are adjusted by indicators (sliding pegs, bands, and sliding bands), have fallen from 15% of countries in 1979 to 9% in 2001.
As a long-term time trend, a shift to the floating ER corner is evident.
More recently, based on finer IMF data, their is some evidence favoring the twocorner hypothesis: ERs adjusted by indicators have declined from 12% to 9% while common currency cases have increased from 20% to 21% and managed floats have risen from 14% to 17% between 1999 and 2001.
Official data on ER regimes have been criticized for being a poor indicator of ER flexibility. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) argue that nominally independent floaters among emerging countries exhibit fear to float through various forms of ER interventions. They provide evidence of low exchange rate volatility relative to international reserve volatility, in comparison to industrial country floaters. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) take up this point by constructing a new database of ER regimes, inferred from cluster analysis of ER and reserve behavior. In their classification, de facto fixed ERs stand at 57% of the world distribution in 2000 (above the IMF's 49% for 2001) while de facto managed (dirty) and independent (free) floats are 20% (well below the IMF's 42%). However, they also confirm a long-term trend decline in de facto fixed ERs and a rise in de facto independent floats between 1979 and 2000.
1 Von Hagen and Zhou (2001) Conditional probabilities of having one regime in place, given the choice of the other regime, differ strongly in various cells of Table 3 . For example, the conditional probability of having an independent float when an inflation target is in place is 81%. The opposite conditional probability -adopting an inflation target when an independent float is in place -attains only 28%.
Managed floats -often based on non-disclosed or ad-hoc rules of interventions -are strongly associated to no conventional or explicit monetary regime (26 of 31 countries).
This stands in contrast to independent floats, which are more likely to be associated to explicit money or inflation targets (20 of 47 countries). Hence rule-based ER regimes tend to be associated to rule-based monetary regimes.
There are various reasons for the large and still ongoing shifts in ER and M regimes that are observed worldwide, including the following: Table 4 in the annex summarizes some of the empirical estimates of specific costs and benefits in the EMU context (and elsewhere, if applicable). Major results are reported in the bullet points below.
Overview of Costs and Benefits of Giving up a National Currency
• The traditional OCA literature (Mundell 1961 , McKinnon 1963 argues that countries joining a monetary union will benefit from lower transaction costs associated from trading goods and assets in different currencies. Lower transaction costs would enhance trade and therefore generate higher benefits from economic specialization.
• Recent empirical evidence stresses the large positive effects of currency unions on trade (Rose 2000, Glick and and income (Frankel and Rose 2002 ). However, new 3 As of early 2002, 20 countries have adopted inflation targeting regimes (Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia 2002) . 4 There is a large body of recent literature on optimal exchange rate regimes that we will not review in this article. For the case of emerging market economies see Larraín and Velasco (2002) and for Latin America see French-Davis and Larraín (2002) and Escaith et al. (2002). evidence suggests that Rose and associates might be grossly overestimating the impact of currency unions on trade due to sample selection and non-linearities (Persson 2001) and the endogeneity of the decision to join the union (Tenreyro 2001 ).
• Other potential microeconomic efficiency gains from joining a currency union are due to elimination of nominal exchange rate volatility and hence lower interest rates, lower real exchange rate volatility, larger financial integration, and (in the case of joining a dominant currency area, like the euro) international acceptance of the currency.
• The microeconomic efficiency gains of a currency union might be offset by lower macroeconomic flexibility. Countries joining a currency union lose their ability to stabilize output through an independent counter-cyclical monetary policy and give up nominal exchange rate flexibility. In sum, the traditional approach states that countries with close international trade and financial links are more likely to be members of an OCA whereas countries with asymmetric business cycles are less likely.
• For candidates of a currency union microeconomic benefits increase and macroeconomic costs decline with their degree of trade integration and business cycle symmetry. Empirical studies for the EU show that countries with closer trade linkages exhibit highly correlated business cycles.
• OCA criteria are dynamic: net benefits of currency union increase after joining the union because trade integration and business cycle correlation become higher than before joining the union (Frankel and Rose 1998 , Rose and Engel 2001 .
• Non-traditional OCA factors that determine the choice to join a currency union include the distribution of seigniorage, interregional fiscal transfers, and substituting the traditional lender of last resort. The net effect of the former seems to be very small but unevenly distributed, especially as seigniorage is shared among EMU participants, there are different views regarding the importance of the latter two factors.
• There is fairly conclusive evidence that benefits of EMU outweigh costs by a relatively large margin. This seems to be especially true for smaller members at the center of the union, where the loss of the exchange rate instrument does not have any significant costs (e.g. Austria, Benelux).
• However net benefits of monetary union are not similar for all members. EMU members at the periphery may not be as strongly viable members in the long run in comparison to the states of the U.S. (Kouparitsas 1999) . Analogously, EMU is estimated to be successful for all original 12 EU countries only if fiscal reforms are pursued in order to attain larger comovement among all members (Haug et al. 2000) .
• Output variability: less through aggregation effect; mean of stochastic variables fluctuates by less than its components.
• The loss of seigniorage is marginal once price stability has been reached and minimum reserve requirements are harmonized and remunerated. Differences in preferences regarding cash holdings (currently the predominant reason for "winners and losers") might diminish over time as the importance of cash is being reduced (plastic money, etc.) but not eliminated (need for cash in the underground and criminal economies).
• Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2002) estimate the growth effects of EU membership using an endogenous growth model and panel data. They find a growth bonus from EU membership which is relatively higher for poorer member countries and which is permanent.
Selective Issues On Long-Run Sustainability of a Monetary Union
This section discusses four key issues that are crucial in the theory and experience of European economic and monetary union: the role of fiscal policies, labor market issues and financial market integration and supervision.
5 A political outlook of EMU will conclude this section.
Role of Fiscal Policies: Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic, Monetary Dominance, and Fiscal Coordination
The relationship between fiscal and monetary policies in MUs has been an object of many studies in recent years. Much of this is a reaction to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the Pact for Stability and Growth (SGP), adopted by the EU-Council 1997. 6 The Treaty institutionalized binding fiscal rules for monetary convergence; the Pact specified these rules and empowers the Council to impose sanctions for non-compliance as a non-interest bearing deposit (maximum 0.5% of GDP) which is converted into a fine after two years, unless the excessive deficit has been corrected.
Are such fiscal rules really necessary for the success of a MU? Some authors suggest that they may be a nuisance (see Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998) . Some argue from the perspective of static macroeconomics, on which the theory of optimum currency areas is built. According to this view no restrictions on the use of fiscal policies should be imposed: IS and LM curves can be shifted independently. Of course, for reasons of policy efficiency, policy coordination should seek optimal policy mixes. Yet, given that monetary policy is centralized in MUs and, in the case of EMU, shaped by the ESCB, it is argued that "nationalized" or even "regionalized" fiscal policies should be fixed individually and complemented by an interregional fiscal transfer mechanism to cope with asymmetric shocks within the MU.
From a neoclassical perspective, binding fiscal rules could also be unwarranted. If
Ricardian Equivalence holds, fiscal deficits are macroeconomically irrelevant and have no effects on real interest rates. If it does not hold but financial markets are efficient, sovereign credit risk will be priced like any other financial risk and reflected by interest rate spreads or by credit rationing. Why should there exist bureaucratic and political procedures, based on an ambiguous pact, which determine "excessive deficits" and result in fining states?
Would big EU members really comply with fiscal rules or, if needed, just demonstrate their political muscle? Instead, these authors argue, one should trust in the functioning of market mechanisms.
In contrast to these views, there is now a growing literature on why fiscal rules make sense in a monetary union. Obviously, issues about imperfect financial markets, especially with the pricing of sovereign credit risks can be raised. Yet, another basis of justifying fiscal rules are insights of dynamic macroeconomics. E.g., Sargent-Wallace's unpleasant monetarist arithmetic argues that a restrictive monetary policy, yielding a small inflation tax (seigniorage) only, may be insufficient to balance exogenously determined primary public deficits. Public debt may explode. To avoid this, monetary policy needs to adapt at some future date, providing more seigniorage. Then monetary policy yields to fiscal policy in a game of chicken between monetary and fiscal authorities (SargentWallace 1981) . Winckler-Hochreiter-Brandner (1998) (SGP). In addition, the coordination among regional fiscal authorities seems necessary. Woodford (1995 Woodford ( , 1998 , Canzoneri-Diba (1996) , Buiter (1998) (1) higher inflation taxes respectively more seigniorage, based on a shift to a more expansionary monetary policy stance, thus diminishing the burden of nominal debt or (2) introduction of fiscal policies aimed at reducing primary deficits in subsequent periods. The former would indicate a fiscal dominant regime, since monetary policy adapts, whereas the latter describes a monetary dominant regime, since fiscal policies change. The term "dominance" reminds us of the term "unpleasant arithmetic".
Unfortunately, empirical tests aimed at assessing regime shifts from fiscal to monetary dominance in the EU (or the other way around) are highly inconclusive, see Canzoneri-Diba (1996) 7 . A visual inspection of aggregate EU data suggests however, (although only few observations are taken into account) that in 1993, when the Maastricht Treaty became effective, a regime shift from fiscal to monetary dominance took place.
Monetary dominance was reinforced in 1996 as is visually illustrated in the figure below.
Fiscal rules in monetary unions are necessary, but that does not imply a formal SGP.
A formal SGP hence is not necessary, but is it sufficient? Based on the seminal paper by Mundell (1961) some argue that the SGP is not sufficient to maintain a monetary union since it lacks a transfer mechanism to cope with asymmetric shocks. However, Kletzer and von Hagen (2001) argue that the welfare effects of such fiscal insurance schemes are quite ambiguous. The authors conclude that this is the main reason why in contrast to Mundell´s claim and popular arguments in the policy debate no substantial fiscal insurance schemes against asymmetric shocks are necessary in a MU. The SGP is thus sufficient.
Another criticism has been that the SGP unnecessarily constrains national fiscal policy in case of idiosyncratic shocks. Yet, if the Pact´s goal of close to balance or in surplus over the medium term i.e. over the business cycle, is reached, then automatic stabilizers can work unconstrained without endangering the 3% deficit limit. Thus, under normal circumstances, the SGP does not unduly constrain fiscal policy. Yet, the Treaty, at the same time stipulates that, under exceptional circumstances, the 3% deficit limit may be overshot without invoking the excessive deficit procedure. 
Labor Mobility, Wage Flexibility and Integration
The elimination of the nominal exchange rate as an instrument to absorb idiosyncratic shocks raises the question about how such shocks can be dealt with without straining MU. Mundell (1963) argued that a MU is feasible as long as there is sufficient labor market mobility and/or aggregate and relative real wage flexibility. In contrast to the US, Europe is said to lack both (Layard et al. 1994; Tyrväinen 1995) and thus EMU is bound to raise unemployment and political tensions (Feldstein 1997 and . While labor mobility in Europe has been low and has hardly changed even since the establishment of the single market, there is some evidence that real wage flexibility has increased in recent years (OECD 2002 ???) .
At the same time there remain uncertainties regarding the evolution of trade unions. (2001) argue that EMU alters the strategic interactions among wage bargaining partners. In a MU, trade unions become relatively smaller, feel macroeconomically less responsible and thus will be more aggressive when negotiating wage contracts. As a result, unemployment will rise. Knell (2001) extends this model to open economies and, in contrast, finds that the establishment of EMU has had no effect on unemployment, essentially because a shadow MU existed before 1999. Well before 1999 trade unions were concerned with international competitiveness and price stability, which was guaranteed by the anchor central bank (the Bundesbank). As a consequence there was no regime shift when Stage Three of EMU started.
Yet there are at least two issues regarding the evolution of trade unions and the centralization and decentralization of wage bargaining processes, respectively, in EMU.
The first relates to the question of whether trade unions will remain nationally segmented or whether they will attempt to "regain their relative size" by cooperating and eventually merging across EMU. Calmfors (2001) argues that transnational wage setting seems unlikely due to prohibitive coordination costs. If at all, one could imagine trans-EMU wage bargaining taking place only in multinational firms.
The second issue relates to unemployment as a regional (and sectoral) problem (Soltwedel et al. 1999) . Unemployment rates show large intra-EMU dispersion, with very high rates observed in weak regions like Eastern Germany, the Mezzogiorno, and various regions in Spain, Portugal, and Greece. The European Commission (2000), the IMF (1999), and the OECD (1999) have identified European unemployment as a predominantly structural problem which can only be tackled through fundamental labor market reform. At the same time highly different unemployment rates call for a decentralization of wage bargaining and setting, down to firm levels, to allow for larger relative wage dispersion (Davies and Hallet, 2001 ).
To conclude: Stage Three of EMU did not imply regime shifts in labor markets of participating countries. Labor mobility did not change and, in any case, is not necessary for a smooth functioning of EMU. The really important issues are real wage flexibility and structural adjustment. While some progress has been made much more is needed.
Financial Integration and Supervision
Financial market integration is a worldwide phenomenon, driven by globalization and technological progress. Adoption of the euro added another catalytic dimension for financial integration in the Eurozone. Following its introduction in January 1999, the Our own conclusion is that no major change of the European institutional regulatory and supervisory architecture is in the offing. The same is true for a more precise delineation of LOLR functions in the ESCB. The first major (systemic) crisis will provide the litmus test regarding the adequacy of current institutional arrangements and the improvements now being implemented in the field of supervision (e.g. the round table of chairs of supervisory committees, the strengthening of central bank involvement in some of the euro area countries).
Political Outlook
The euro area is now characterized by one common currency and one monetary policy. Albeit sovereignty of member countries is constrained by the law of the EU, they remain separate political entities pursuing independent policies. Hence the issue arises whether a monetary union can work without a political union.
There are three main factors which may jeopardize the functioning of a MU not backed by a political union (see Theurl 2000: 17 ff):
(1) Asymmetric shocks increase, making a common monetary policy highly controversial in some member states. Then the latter may wish to opt out to avoid depression, deflation or default.
(2) Political quarrels on the goals of monetary policy set in. Since the Maastricht treaty seems to be clearly specified in that respect, such quarrels are unlikely. However, events like those following September 11, 2001 may trigger disputes on the fundamental role of monetary policy.
(3) Political power structures change within some member countries, making it likely for one member to pursue economic policies that provoke the breakup of MU.
In any case, political union contributes to the stability of a MU but does not seem to be necessary for its success, especially if the MU is sufficiently institutionalized or exit costs are sufficiently large.
Section 4: Recent Trends and Future Options of Monetary Regimes in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)
In this section we review recent trends in monetary and exchange rate regimes in LAC and discuss future regime, with particular attention to MU, in the light of the recent literature and the EMU experience.
Exchange Rate and Monetary Regime Trends in LAC.
The world trend away from pegged ER regimes and toward more flexible arrangements noted in section 2 is even more pronounced in LAC. 10 Regarding M regimes, the world trend toward inflation targeting among floaters is also more intense in LAC.
In 1994 LAC's dominant regime combination was an ER regime of limited flexibility (adjustable peg or band) combined with an ER or a monetary growth target (Table 3) In sum: LAC is a very heterogeneous region where countries differ widely in size, structure, and politics. Hence they also vary significantly in economic factors and political conditions that shape their choice of M and ER regimes. 
Regional trade blocks and accession to outside blocks
Costs and Benefits of Giving up National Currencies in LAC
There are few studies for LAC countries or regions on OCA criteria, micro benefits, and macro costs of unilateral dollarization or adopting a common currency. However some recent work focuses on some OCA criteria for the region and assesses the benefits of subregional monetary union and unilateral dollarization. American output levels. These findings point against the choice of fixed ERs, MU or unilateral dollarization in these three countries. However real ERs are found to be only weakly responsive to US interest rate and terms-of-trade shocks in the three countries, weakening arguments that favor floats.
11
As opposed to the findings by Frankel and Rose (1998) and Rose and Engel (2001) for the EU, Calderón et al. (2002) show that the impact of trade integration on business cycle synchronization is much smaller in developing countries in general and, in the case of LAC, is not significantly different from zero. 12 For Caricom countries, Kendall (2000) finds little evidence of exchange rate convergence, confirming the more general results by Rose and Engel (2001) quoted above.
Morandé and Schmidt-Hebbel (2000) assess the pros and cons of unilateral dollarization and joining a MU for Chile. High production and export specialization in commodities and highly idiosyncratic external and domestic shocks explain the negative (or low positive) output correlation between Chile and prospective currency partners in Mercosur, the U.S. or the EU. Chile is found to be a less likely candidate for currency union or unilateral dollarization than Argentina, Brazil or Mexico.
Monetary Union in Mercosur and Nafta
In discussing the options of a monetary union for Mercosur, Eichengreen (1998) finds that Mercosur members exhibit unusually large real exchange rate volatility, reflecting, inter alia, the influence of idiosyncratic macroeconomic shocks. Levy Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2000) find that Mercosur countries fail the tests implied by OCA criteria.
Intra-Mercosur trade integration is very low in comparison to the EU, as documented by Belke and Gros (2002) , and hence much larger intra-Mercosur exchange-rate variability is required. Mercosur institutions and policies are weaker than those in the EU, making
Mercosur more subject to idiosyncratic shocks that require more exchange-rate flexibility.
Weak output correlation and nationally segmented labor markets reduce the scope for labor markets to absorb asymmetric shocks that are larger in Mercosur than in Nafta or EMU.
Mercosur countries exhibit large differences in fiscal policy, banking strength, prudential financial regulation, and labor market flexibility, exemplified in extremis by Argentina's current crisis. Before achieving significant progress in domestic reform and international coordination in these areas, a common Mercosur currency remains a distant dream.
Recent studies assess the costs and benefits for Canada and Mexico to join the U.S.
in a MU (Buiter 1999 , Morales 1999 , Chriszt 2000 . Regarding prerequisites, much progress in financial and labor market integration has to be achieved and the issue of LOLR has to be addressed before adopting a Nafta MU. Even if economic arguments favor such a union, political factors may be the largest remaining hindrance. At present, the will to relinquish monetary sovereignty to the U.S. is not well developed in its two partners and the U.S. does not appear enthusiastic to share its monetary sovereignty. Buiter argues that the difficulty in attaining political accountability by a North American central bank ensures that a Nafta MU is highly unlikely.
Dollarization
Substitution of the US dollar for national currencies has a long history in LAC.
Currency and asset substitution was a rational response to high domestic inflation, weak banks, and pervasive devaluation fears. De facto dollarization of transactions and asset holdings exhibits hysteresis and hence is difficult to reverse (Calvo and Végh 1992) . Large de facto dollarization is widespread in small and medium-sized LAC economies, for example in Bolivia, Guatemala and Uruguay. In addition, all LAC economies hold large amounts of US dollar-denominated net foreign liabilities, exposing them to significant wealth losses in the wake of currency devaluation. De facto dollarization and large dollar debts often dominate conventional OCA criteria when evaluating official dollarization -as recently demonstrated by El Salvador. Panizza et al. (2000) argue that official dollarization in Central American and Caribbean economies may reduce inflation and financial fragility by reducing the volatility of key relative prices. Edwards (2001) , confirming the inflation gain from dollarization, argues against dollarization by providing evidence that dollarized countries grow at significantly lower rates and are not spared from major current account reversals.
Lessons from EMU and Prospects for Regime Choice in LAC
The EMU experience offers lessons for prospective MU plans in LAC. First, a sound fiscal policy plays a dominant role among the prerequisites for successful MU.
Maastricht and the SGP engineered a reversion from fiscal to monetary dominance in the Eurozone. LAC has accomplished on average significant progress towards fiscal stability during the last decade but many countries remain fiscally fragile -Argentina is just the extreme case of fiscal profligacy and conflict.
Second, EMU is not an example regarding labor market flexibility, as noted above.
Neither is LAC, where two models of labor markets are observed. In non-English speaking countries (i.e., most of LAC), labor markets are beset by rigid legislation and rules, Our review of the empirical evidence on OCA criteria for EMU members leads to the unsurprising but strong conclusion that the evidence that benefits of EMU outweigh costs by a relatively large margin although net benefits are not similar for all members. This result may have been influenced by the fact that the majority of the present members of EMU have been in a quasi-MU with Germany long before Stage Three of EMU started due to their fixed exchange rate arrangements.
Our review of four key issues that are crucial in the theory and experience of European economic and monetary union led us to the following conclusions. First, while fiscal rules are necessary in EMU, the SGP is sufficient but not necessary. Second, it is not so much labor mobility that is important for a smooth functioning of EMU but rather real wage flexibility and structural adjustment. Third, no major change of the European institutional regulatory or its supervisory architecture structure from national to supranational "dominance" is in the offing. Yet, this does not jeopardize monetary union, at least for the time being. Fourth, EMU will survive also in the absence of political union since it seems to be sufficiently institutionalized and the exit costs are sufficiently large.
Finally, which are the prospects for regional or sub-regional monetary union in LAC? Recent trends confirm even more strongly for LAC than for the rest of the world the two-corner hypothesis, particular the flight to the floating cum inflation-targeting corner. A strong push toward bilateral and multilateral regional trade agreements and trade agreements with the US and the EU have been reached during the last decade and are expected to be signed in the near future. However, with exception of highly successful NAFTA, the multilateral intra-regional trade agreements have been marred by political setbacks and administrative violations that severely hamper effective trade integration.
Some empirical evidence on the costs and benefits of giving up national currencies in LAC show significantly less favorable conditions for LAC countries than for EU nations. Low intra-regional trade, large idiosyncratic shocks, major differences in institutions and policies, and large heterogeneity in development levels point against intra-regional monetary union under current conditions. Dollarization seems to be more feasible for those smaller LAC economies that are highly correlated and integrated with the U.S. and/or are pushed to abandon their national currencies because of unfavorable domestic conditions.
However for the majority of medium-sized and large economies, neither intra-regional monetary union nor dollarization appear to dominate their recent decision to strengthen national currencies by adopting a floating exchange rate with inflation targeting. However, in doing so and succeeding to lock in macroeconomic stability and relative price flexibility, the latter countries may be on the best course to start a successful path toward intra-regional monetary union in the long term. (1): Data set only considers countries (or monetary areas) with an independent currency. Sum of percentages exceeds 100% as countries can fit in more than one class. 
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